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    Title Insurance Client Alert – Virginia Court of Appeals Affirms Injunction to Remove Objects from Granted Easement Area

    By James L. Windsor, M. Grayson Owens, Real Estate Claims & Title Insurance Solutions

    Yesterday, the Court of Appeals of Virginia issued a significant opinion in Thibault Enterprises, LLC v. David A. Yost, et al., Yost Living Trust, a case involving a dispute over a 50-foot granted easement for ingress and egress. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision to grant an injunction requiring the owner of the servient estate to remove objects that narrowed the width of the easement, even though the objects did not interfere with the current use of the easement. The Court also affirmed the circuit court’s determination of the location of the easement based on the language of the deed and the attached plat.

    Relevant Facts

    David A. Yost, as trustee of the Yost Living Trust (the “Yost Trustee”), owned a 1.08-acre parcel (the “Trustee’s Parcel”) in Dinwiddie County that was subdivided from a larger property in 1971. The deed conveying the parcel to Yost Trustee (“Trustee Deed”) referenced a plat and an easement for ingress and egress over an outlet road, 50-feet in width, running from the southwestern corner of the Trustee’s Parcel to State Route 601. Thibault Enterprises, LLC (“Thibault”) owned the adjacent property and is subject to the easement.

    Yost Trustee filed a complaint against Thibault seeking injunctive relief and declaratory judgment, alleging that Thibault had placed objects within the easement area, such as poles, outbuildings, mounds of dirt, hay bales, and grapevines, that interfered with the easement and constituted a private nuisance. Thibault conceded that some of the objects were within the easement area but argued that they did not create an unreasonable interference with the easement’s use and that the easement terminated at the southwestern boundary of the Trustee’s Parcel, not at the midwestern boundary as shown on a plat.

    The Circuit Court ruled in favor of Yost Trustee, ordering Thibault to remove the objects from the easement area and finding that the easement extended to the midwestern boundary of the Trustee’s Parcel. Thibault appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Court of Appeals’ Decision

    The Servient Landowner May Not Narrow the Defined Width of the Easement by Placing Obstructions Which Encroach on the Dominant Landowner’s Rights

    On the issue of the objects in the easement, the Court relied on a line of Virginia Supreme Court cases which established a servient landowner may not effectively narrow the defined width of an ingress and egress easement by placing obstructions amounting to a material encroachment on the dominant owner’s rights, even when the encroachment does not materially interfere with ingress and egress at that time. Upon the Court’s review of Virgina Supreme Court cases, it found that, along with the reasonableness standard applied to a servient estate’s encroachment of an easement, there is also a standard that the encroachment must also not narrow the width of the easement. Both standards must be satisfied under Virginia law, not just the reasonableness standard.

    The Court also rejected Thibault’s argument that Virginia Code § 55.1-305, which provides that the owner of the servient estate shall not engage in an activity or cause to be present any objects that unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate, supported its position. The Court looked to Piney Meeting House Invests., Inc. v. Hart, 284 Va. 187 (2012), which stated the question is twofold, not simply unreasonable interference. First, whether it unreasonably interferes, then whether the use narrows the width of the easement, which it did in this case, making it a material encroachment.

    The Court held that Virginia Code § 55.1-305 did not change the common law rule that an encroachment which narrows the width of an easement is a material encroachment, regardless of reasonableness.

    When a Plat is incorporated Into the Deed, it Becomes Part of the Instrument Itself. In Addition, References on the Plat to Deeds Recorded Incorporate the Legal Descriptions of those Deeds into the Plat.

    On appeal, Thibault argued the circuit court erred in ruling the easement terminated at the midwestern boundary line of the Trustee’s Parcel, instead of the southwestern corner. Thibault further asserted the deed unambiguously provided the easement began at the southwestern corner.

    The Court held that the deed granted an easement over an outlet road, which was depicted on the plat, and that the plat showed that the easement ran from State Route 601 to the midpoint of the Trustee’s Parcel’s western boundary, not the southwestern boundary. The Court rejected Thibault’s argument that the deed’s reference to the southwestern corner of the parcel was controlling and held that the deed’s language did not provide a more particular description of the easement than the plat.

    The Court also distinguished a case cited by Thibault, Smith v. Bailey, 141 Va. 757 (1925), which held that a metes and bounds description in a deed prevailed over a general reference to a plat. The Court reasoned that, in this case, the deed did not provide a metes and bounds description of the easement. Rather, the deed simply states that it grants “the right of ingress and egress over an outlet road, fifty (50) feet in width, running from the southwestern corner of the lands hereinbefore conveyed to State Route #601.” Importantly, the Court explained that providing an exact point for the southwestern corner does not rise to the level of a metes and bounds description of the easement itself, and without a metes and bounds description, the plat will be the prevailing instrument.

    Continuing its analysis, the Court went on to explain that when a deed incorporates a plat by reference, that plat must be considered part of the instrument itself. Moreover, references on the plat to deeds recorded incorporate the legal descriptions of those deeds into the plat and, thus, into any subsequent deeds referencing the plat. Auerbach v. Cnty. of Hanover, 252 Va. 410, 414 (1996).

    Implications

    This case illustrates the importance of carefully drafting and/or reviewing language granting easements with a defined width and reviewing deeds and plats that grant or reserve easements with a defined width. The case also demonstrates that the owner of the dominant estate has the right to the full granted width of the easement as defined by the deed and as shown on the plat, and that the owner of the servient estate may not place any objects in the easement that would narrow its width, even if they do not unreasonably interfere with the current use of the easement.

    If you have any questions regarding this new appellate opinion concerning easements, or questions regarding Virginia real property law in general, please contact Jim Windsor at (757) 873.6308 or jlwindsor@kaufcan.com, or Grayson Owens at (984) 222.8108 or mgowens@kaufcan.com.


    The contents of this publication are intended for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice or a legal opinion on specific facts and circumstances. Copyright 2025.