Cox v. Sony Supreme Court Case

Supreme Court Wrestles with Billion-Dollar Question: When Are ISPs Liable for User Piracy?

On December 1, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in what may prove to be one of the most consequential copyright cases of the digital age: Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc. At stake is not only a potential $1 billion-plus judgment against Cox Communications, but the fundamental question of when internet service providers (ISP) can be held liable for their customers’ copyright infringement.

Background: A Pattern of Alleged Indifference

The case stems from allegations that Cox, which provides internet service to over 6 million residences and businesses, knowingly enabled copyright piracy by failing to terminate subscribers who repeatedly downloaded music illegally via BitTorrent and other peer-to-peer file-sharing protocols. A coalition of record labels and music publishers sued Cox, arguing the ISP received thousands of infringement notices identifying specific repeat offenders but failed to act.

The facts that emerged at trial were damaging. Cox had a 13-strike policy for potentially terminating infringing customers, and the Cox manager who oversaw the Digital Millennium Copyright Act told his team to “F the dmca!!!” A jury in Alexandria, Virginia, found in 2019 that Cox owed the labels $1 billion for its secondary liability for the copyright infringement by its customers of more than 10,000 copyrights.

The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, based in Richmond, VA, threw out the damages award in 2024 after reversing the jury’s finding on one form of secondary liability. However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the contributory infringement finding, setting up Cox’s appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Legal Framework: Contributory Infringement and the DMCA

The Copyright Act does not explicitly define “contributory infringement,” leaving courts to develop the doctrine through case law. Generally, contributory liability requires that a defendant (1) knew of the infringement and (2) materially contributed to it. But what constitutes “material contribution” in the ISP context?

Cox argues that merely providing internet service—a neutral tool that can be used for lawful or unlawful purposes—cannot constitute material contribution without proof that the ISP encouraged or profited from the infringement. The company points out that less than 1% of its users infringe on music copyrights and that its internal compliance measures “got 95% of that less than 1% to stop.”

The record labels counter that Cox’s conduct went far beyond passive facilitation. They argue Cox made a deliberate business decision to prioritize subscriber retention and profits over copyright enforcement, despite receiving millions of infringement notices.

Complicating matters is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which provides safe harbor protections for ISPs—but only if they “reasonably implement” a policy for terminating repeat infringers. The lower court held that the safe harbor was not available to Cox as a matter of law because Cox failed to reasonably implement a policy to terminate repeat infringers, as required by the DMCA.

The Supreme Court Grapples with “Two Extremes”

During oral arguments, the Justices appeared skeptical of both parties’ positions, searching for a middle ground that would hold bad actors accountable without imposing impossible burdens on ISPs.

Justice Sotomayor pushed for answers that would help the Court fashion the right test for these cases, characterizing the arguments on each side as proposing two “extremes” that the Court was tasked with tempering. Sotomayor explained: “We are being put to two extremes here. The other side says, ‘there’s no liability because we’re just putting out into the stream of commerce a good that can be used for good or bad, and we’re not responsible for the infringer’s decision.’ We have the other side… moving away from petitioner’s and the SG’s position that the only way you can have aiding and abetting in this field is if you have purpose… And you’re saying, we don’t have to prove purpose.”

Justice Amy Coney Barrett posed a hypothetical that exposed the breadth of Cox’s legal theory. She pressed the ISP on whether its theory would allow it to escape liability even if it refused to switch off access to users who were known to be engaged in child trafficking. Rosenkranz acknowledged that under his legal theory of the court’s earlier decisions, the company could not be held liable for aiding and abetting that activity.

Meanwhile, several Justices questioned the practical implications of the music industry’s position. Justice Samuel Alito noted a hypothetical situation in which an ISP shuts down a university’s internet account shared by thousands of students and staff members based on a single user’s infringement. “I really don’t see how your position works in that context,” Alito told Clement. Justice Sonia Sotomayor questioned the idea of cutting off the internet for “50,000 or 100,000 people” because “one person in that region continues to inf[ringe].”

Justice Neil Gorsuch, also a conservative, repeatedly suggested that his colleagues side narrowly with Cox and ask the lower court that ruled for the music industry to reconsider that decision under a different standard. Gorsuch said that the law around “secondary liability,” for companies providing a service to the public that is sometimes misused by the public, is murky. “Isn’t that a flag on the field for us?” Gorsuch asked.

Broader Implications: From Streaming to AI

The stakes extend far beyond music piracy. If the Court affirms that an ISP’s failure to act on infringement notices constitutes willful contributory infringement, it may influence future litigation involving streaming services, cloud storage providers, and artificial intelligence platforms. These entities often host or process vast amounts of user content, and a ruling against Cox could shape their liability exposure and operational policies for years to come.

Indeed, X argued in a brief that the appeals court ruling against Cox could “wreak havoc” on the tech industry and specifically on artificial intelligence. X argued that if content creators are permitted to sue AI platforms when people use their technology to violate copyright law, the tech companies would “have no choice but to constrain their actions” to avoid the potential liability.

The case also evokes echoes of earlier technology battles. In an interesting twist, the Supreme Court rejected a similar copyright appeal from the entertainment industry more than 40 years ago. In that case, Universal Studios challenged the maker of a new-fangled technology it feared would be widely used by Americans to engage in copyright infringement. The technology at issue then was the Betamax videocassette recorder, or VCR.

What to Watch For

Based on the oral arguments, the Court appears likely to issue a nuanced ruling that attempts to balance copyright enforcement with practical concerns about internet access. Justice Gorsuch’s suggestion of a narrow remand is one possibility, though the Court may feel compelled to provide clearer guidance on the contributory infringement standard.

Key questions the Court must resolve include:

• What level of knowledge and intent is required for contributory infringement?
• Does “material contribution” require affirmative encouragement, or can passive facilitation suffice in egregious cases?
• How should courts balance the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions with common-law contributory infringement doctrine?
• What practical measures can ISPs reasonably be expected to take when dealing with shared accounts, university networks, or regional service providers?

A decision is expected by June 2026. Whatever the outcome, it will shape copyright enforcement in the digital age for decades to come—and potentially affect how courts approach liability questions for AI platforms, cloud services, and other intermediaries in the modern internet ecosystem.

For now, one thing is clear: the Court recognizes it must find a path between the “two extremes” presented by the parties. As the internet becomes ever more essential to daily life, the question of when service providers become responsible for user misconduct grows only more complex—and more critical.